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LEMMINGS OR LIONS:  
EMPIRICAL MEASURE OF JUROR 





Required by the Sixth and Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, jury trials underpin the justice system. Whether a criminal defendant walks 
free or spends the rest of his life in jail turns on a jury vote. And so does whether 
a hundred-billion dollar, multinational corporation pays damages for alleged en-
vironmental contamination. But are jurors up to the task? Competing images in 
popular culture, in scholarly literature, and among practicing lawyers and judges 
paint jurors in diametrically different ways, as either lemmings or lions. These 
depictions are honest disputes created by literature and anecdotes that could 
support either narrative. 
This study contributes to the ever-evolving understanding of which image of 
a juror is more accurate. Using a fully randomized experimental design, this 
study focuses on a single question: are jurors more likely to vote in favor of lia-
bility in a civil case if that case is framed in issues that align with their own be-
liefs? —a concept referred to in this article as “belief mirroring.” For example, 
will framing a case as a way to protect the underdog and stand-up to corporate 
greed cause more jurors who hold those values vote yes on liability? Conversely, 
will framing the case in conservative language that conflicts with the juror’s 
views turn those jurors off? The results evaluate the degree that the lens through 
which a case is presented can manipulate jurors and effect their decision, rather 
than the hard facts that actually define case. 
The results suggest jurors are more lion than lemming. Jurors of all political 
orientations, ages, races, educations, and genders rejected belief mirroring and 
decided the cases on the facts. This has real world implications for the reliability 
of jurors, as it suggests that jurors cannot be manipulated by attorneys who try to 
frame cases in familiar language. It also has real implications for practicing at-
torneys, as it suggests they should spend most of their time developing the facts of 
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their case, not in trying to frame those facts in language they believe will be fa-
miliar to the jury. 
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INTRODUCTION 
You think your average juror is King Solomon? No, he’s a roofer with a mort-
gage. He wants to go home and sit in his Barcalounger and let the cable TV 
wash over him. And this man doesn’t give a single, solitary droplet of shit 
about truth, justice or your American way. 
Runaway Jury 20031 
 
I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor, ever yet imagined by man, by 
which a government can be held to the principles of it’s [sic] constitution. 
Thomas Jefferson2 
 
A Dog of a Case 
I had an experience early in practice that set me wondering about what re-
ally drives jurors. I share it briefly here. I admit it is a little embarrassing, but it 
was this practical experience that first suggested to me that jurors are more in-
dependent than some imagine. 
As a young lawyer, I was hungry to get in the courtroom whenever I could. 
I hounded my boss for the chance to try cases to juries. And it worked—sort of. 
Sometimes I got really interesting cases, but sometimes I got the “dogs.” The 
first dog I ever tried was a case involving a plaintiff who asserted a car accident 
caused him to need back surgery. There was in fact a car accident, and he was 
hit from behind. But the case had a few, well, let’s call them wrinkles. The cli-
ent spoke only Spanish, the case was set in a rural county in Missouri that was 
over 95 percent white, the client had undergone three back surgeries, had medi-
cal records showing his back was hurt before the accident, was driving a large 
box truck when he was struck from behind, and days after the accident he went 
back to work loading fifty-pound boxes of tile. To this day, I do not know how 
this case made it to our office. Understandably, the defense never offered to 
pay anything of value to settle the case. So, when no one else would touch the 
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2  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), https://founders.archives.g 
ov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0259 [https://perma.cc/SLQ5-YQ8Q]. 
19 NEV. L.J.187, CAMPBELL 1/28/2019  12:41 PM 
190 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1  
 
case with a ten-foot pole, including the attorney responsible for it, I volunteered 
to step in and try the case. 
I picked a jury and for three days I put on all the evidence I could about the 
accident: my client’s medical history, his lost wages, and more. I was prepared, 
succinct, polite, and I had simple themes. I know these things are true because 
after the trial, the jurors told me that they enjoyed the case, appreciated my 
preparation, and clearly understood where I was going. They also shared, quiet-
ly, that none of them liked the other attorney. And that was not entirely surpris-
ing. He was scatterbrained at times, smug at others, and he often tried to stand 
close to the jury when asking questions, causing a few of them to look more 
than a little uncomfortable. Several times I saw the jurors actually lean away 
from him. And at one point the judge told him to stop “crowding the poor ju-
rors.” 
I lost that case. The jury found for the defendant and gave my client no 
money. And I am glad they did because it was then and there that I really start-
ed to believe in juries. Those jurors looked past personality and preparation and 
decided the case on the facts as they saw them. 
As a prologue, I dejectedly called back to the office and shared the results. 
After all, it hurts to lose a trial. I still remember my boss’s words. He said, 
“Hell John, we all knew that was a suicide mission. Get back home and we’ll 
find you something a little better to work on.” 
This study is born out of that trial in rural Missouri. From that day, I began 
to believe that jurors were far less susceptible to charming attorneys than some 
of those attorneys would like to believe. This study is an attempt to quantify 
whether it is true that jurors can resist attorneys who play to their beliefs. In 
short, it asks whether jurors are manipulated by what I call “belief mirroring”—
the presentation of a case in terms and frames that mirror the beliefs of a juror. 
The answer is not entirely obvious. Among scholars, lawyers, and the public as 
a whole, opinions differ intensely regarding the reliability of jurors and juries. 
On the one hand, the Constitution ensures a right to trial by jury in criminal 
cases and in all civil cases over $20.3 And the forefathers spoke of juries as a 
fundamental check on judicial overreach. Justice Byron White is famously 
quoted as saying, “The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbi-
trary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the community 
as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to 
the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.”4 
Trial lawyers often proclaim that juries can be trusted, and many who have 
served on juries report the experience convinced them that jurors take the work 
                                                        
3  U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII. 
4  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
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seriously.5 Similarly, some of the most respected juror scholars have written in 
defense of juries.6 
On the other hand, the popular media spent years reporting what it por-
trayed as outlandish jury verdicts, and the public often leveled the same criti-
cisms.7 The McDonald’s hot coffee case is known by most Americans.8 87 per-
cent of white Americans and 57 percent of black Americans now believe O.J. 
Simpson was guilty despite the fact that a jury acquitted him.9 Similar numbers 
apply to the Casey Anthony trial.10 Businesses avoid juries by using arbitration 
clauses, often justifying the decision by asserting that juries are unpredictable 
and prone to producing runaway verdicts.11 These ideas have seeped even into 
Hollywood, where the tagline for the 2003 movie Runaway Jury was, “[t]rials 
are too important to be decided by juries.”12 
Even in the actual legal world, there is disagreement about juries’ capacity 
to decide cases. Appellate rules largely defer to jury decision-making and re-
fuse to review the jury’s fact finding.13 But that is as far as the unanimity goes. 
Some courts allow specific types of damage arguments, arguing specifically 
that jurors are capable of considering, and when appropriate, rejecting argu-
                                                        
5  For example, the American Board of Trial Advocates, which includes plaintiff and defense 
attorneys, advocates to “Save Our Juries.” SAVE OUR JURIES, http://saveourjuries.org [https:// 
perma.cc/72E3-A7NS] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018). 
6  See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 255, 278 (2005) (noting that “[t]he picture of real juries that emerges from this review 
provides little evidence that the jury fails to live up to the trust placed in it.”). 
7  See, e.g., Bonnie Bertram, Storm Still Brews Over Scalding Coffee, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 25, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/booming/storm-still-brews-over-scalding-coffe 
e.html [https://perma.cc/GFA2-NV97] (chronicling the various reactions to the McDonald’s 
case, including public response). 
8  See Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1 (D.N.M. 
Aug. 18, 1994). 
9  Carl Bialik, Most Black People Now Think O.J. Was Guilty, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 9, 
2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/most-black-people-now-think-oj-simpson-was-guil 
ty/ [https://perma.cc/BN5X-75RX]. 
10  Lydia Saad, Americans Express Mixed Confidence in Criminal Justice System, GALLUP 
(July 11, 2011), http://news.gallup.com/poll/148433/americans-express-mixed-confidence-cr 
iminal-justice-system.aspx [https://perma.cc/34SX-D8YC]. 
11  Robert Fojo, 12 Reasons Businesses Should Use Arbitration Agreements, LAWGIVES 
(Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.lawgives.com/guide/551c5a687777773fa5160200/12-Reasons-B 
usinesses-Should-Use-Arbitration-Agreements [https://perma.cc/RG6B-C6UM]. 
12  RUNAWAY JURY, supra note 1. 
13  Anthony Viorst, Appellate Standards of Review, 56 TRIAL TALK 19, 20 (2007). 
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ments.14 Other courts prohibit the exact same arguments, reasoning the argu-
ments will confuse jurors.15 
These differing views of jurors trickle down to how jurors are treated. 
 
A Skeptical View of Jurors 
Among those who believe jurors are impressionable, perhaps even unpre-
dictable creatures, we see the effects in many places. For example, many rules 
of evidence are aimed at sheltering jurors from information that courts con-
cluded would prejudice or confuse jurors. Here, for example, consider the ex-
clusion of liability insurance,16 hearsay,17 the general right to exclude “prejudi-
cial information,”18 and the practice in many courts of not telling jurors how 
punitive damages are allocated or whether or not there are damage caps in the 
state.19 
Based on the belief that jurors are easily swayed, many trial advocacy clas-
ses focus on developing a theme, using a “phrase that pays,” and in general, be-
ing “on” for the jury.20 It is not uncommon for a student enrolled in a trial ad-
vocacy course to tell me about the metaphor they have come up with that will 
sway the jurors, or how the confidence they project will earn the jury’s trust. 
The crafters of rules of evidence and trial advocacy professors are not 
alone. In the day-to-day practice of law, there are trial lawyers who treat jurors 
more like lemmings than lions.21 Many lawyers advocate in seminars and write 
in articles that jurors are impressionable, prone to noticing things like what 
                                                        
14  John Campbell et al., Time Is Money: An Empirical Assessment of Non-Economic Dam-
ages Arguments, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017) (explaining that some courts allow per di-
em arguments, reasoning juries can parse them, while others prohibit them precisely because 
they argue those same jurors cannot work through the argument). 
15  Id. 
16  FED. R. EVID. 411. 
17  FED. R. EVID. 801–03. 
18  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
19  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance About 
Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1375–77 
(2005). 
20  Charles H. Rose III, Professor at Stetson Univ. Coll. of L., Oxford Storytelling Lecture 5–
6, (notes available at https://www.stetson.edu/law/studyabroad/oxford/media/Oxford-Storyte 
lling.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A8E-E7XA]) (last visited Sept. 20, 2018). 
21  See, e.g., Allison Leotta, Your Body Language During Trial Can Be Just as Important as 
What You Say, ABA J. (Dec. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/motion_ap 
plied_body_language_trial/ [https://perma.cc/6VLE-Q982]; Philip N. Meyer, How Social 
Emotions Can Influence Jury Deliberations, ABA J. (Oct. 2015), http://www.abajournal.com 
/magazine/article/how_social_emotions_can_influence_jury_deliberations [https://perma.cc/ 
5JA7-JL7W]. 
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shoes an attorney wears or how the attorney treats the court staff.22 Others sug-
gest that jurors make up their minds quickly in cases, despite instructions not 
to, and this means that the opening statement must win them over, lest the at-
torney lose the chance to win the case.23 Indeed, I even knew a lawyer who had 
a tanning bed in his office because he said that jurors needed to see him as fit 
and active. 
The View of Jurors as Diligent and Reliable 
Among those who trust jurors and think they are relatively diligent and 
careful, a different view prevails. Academics advocate for jury reform that 
gives jurors more information, lets them ask questions of witnesses, and allows 
them to deliberate as the trial progresses.24 These academics suggest that tort 
reform is not needed to reign in runaway jurors and that many of the criticisms 
are unfounded.25 They argue that jurors are at least as good as judges at decid-
ing what is fair.26 In one example, Diamond & Rose concluded, “The picture of 
real juries that emerges from this review provides little evidence that the jury 
fails to live up to the trust placed in it. Juries make mistakes and they display 
evidence of bias, but there is no convincing evidence that another decision 
maker would do better.”27 
Professors who view jurors as largely reliable teach classes on discovery or 
evidence organization based on the belief that facts are what win cases, not cha-
risma. They teach young lawyers to avoid trying to manipulate jurors, arguing 
that jurors will sense it and reject it. Diamond states that despite common per-
ception, juries do not start out deliberations favoring one side over the other.28 
Diamond cautions lawyers, however, stating that although juries do not begin 
deliberations in favor of one side, juries do react to lawyers.29 Diamond warns 
attorneys, stating, “Don’t ever let the jurors think that you’re talking down to 
them.”30 
Trial lawyers who trust jurors take an entirely different approach to cases. 
They spend more time working to make sure their presentations are organized, 
accurate, and succinct, rather than on whether their presentation will be atten-
                                                        
22  See, e.g., Ann Farmer, Order in the Closet: Why Attire for Women Lawyers Is Still an Is-
sue, PERSPS., Fall 2010, at 5 (advocating that an attorney should wear clothes that will “not 
be noticed”). 
23  See Hans Zeisel, A Jury Hoax: The Superpower of the Opening Statement, LITIG., Sum-
mer 1988, at 17, 18 (explaining how this belief may have come into existence and how per-
vasive this “truth” became). 
24  William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 143–44. 
25  Diamond & Rose, supra note 6, at 262. 
26  Id. at 263. 
27  Id. at 278. 
28  Terry Carter, A Peek into the Jury Room, ABA J. (Mar. 2007), http://www.abajournal.co 
m/magazine/article/a_peek_into_the_jury_room/ [https://perma.cc/664U-SSTP]. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
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tion grabbing.31 They often tell jurors that rather than try to spin the facts; they 
will merely present them for consideration.32 And these attorneys do not spend 
much time picking out their outfits for court. 
So, who is right? And if it is those who believe that jurors consider facts 
carefully, pay attention, and try to follow jury instructions, what accounts for 
the fact that jurors can see the same case and reach differing conclusions? 
 
Measuring whether Jurors Are Manipulated by Case Framing that Aligns 
with Personal Views 
This study provides insight into juror decision making by examining 
whether they can be swayed by: (1) arguments that intentionally frame cases in 
a way that lines up with the jurors self-reported views (belief mirroring), and 
(2) whether introducing the manipulative frame before or after the evidence 
matters (primacy and recency effects). To achieve this, jurors read case facts 
plucked from real-life cases. They were randomly assigned to see those facts 
along with: (1) a progressive argument in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a conserva-
tive argument, (3) a blended argument in which conservative and progressive 
ideas were mentioned, or (4) no argument at all—only the case facts. We also 
manipulated whether jurors read one of the three frames before or after they 
read the facts. 
An example helps make the study design clear. Consider a juror who, 
based on her answers to study questions, rates bullying as a serious problem, 
believes society must stand up for the marginalized, and states that companies 
put profits over people. If this juror is presented with a case that alleges gender 
discrimination, is she more likely to find that a company discriminated against 
women if she hears an opening statement that frames the case in terms of stand-
ing up to a bully, protecting a woman, and keeping the company from putting 
profits over people? Or is she more likely to find liability when she hears the 
case framed as a conservative one in which the woman was fired because the 
company did not value her work ethic, or the woman was disloyal, and was 
“too PC” about her decisions? 
Perhaps even some who see jurors as reliable would nonetheless predict 
that juries would respond best to arguments that align with their views and that 
they might chafe against arguments that use ideas and phrases they do not agree 
with. These predictions would be consistent with literature on confirmation bi-
as, halo effects, and cultural cognition generally.33 Similarly, it would be rea-
sonable to predict that presenting the arguments before the facts are read would 
                                                        
31  Michael H. Simon, Things That I Learned During My First Year on the Bench That I 
Wish I Had Known as a Trial Lawyer, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 348–49 (2013). 
32  Id. at 348. 
33  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 81–82 (2011). 
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color how jurors receive those facts, consistent with cognitive science literature 
on priming and primacy.34 
As this article will show, the answer is that neither scenario changes the ju-
ror’s vote. Surprisingly, jurors did not find liability more often when they read 
arguments that tied the cases to ideas they support. Nor did they find against 
liability when they read arguments that framed the case in terms with which 
they disagree. Instead, jurors cast aside the frames and decided the cases on the 
facts. This outcome was true whether they were presented with the argument 
before or after they read the case facts. 
The implications are encouraging. Jurors are not sheep. And they can look 
past arguments they like, and those they do not, and decide based on the merits. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This section discusses some of the existing literature relevant to the four 
hypotheses addressed by this paper. 
A. Hypothesis 1: Some juror characteristics and beliefs will correlate with 
liability rates that deviate from the mean. 
To put a slightly finer point on this hypothesis, the prediction was that at 
least some characteristics of jurors (gained through voir dire-like questions at 
the beginning of the study) would have a statistically significant relationship to 
liability determination. It is important to note, however, that I did not predict 
that basic demographic information like age, race, gender, education, and in-
come would correlate to liability determinations. Although those factors might 
matter in an individual case, in my experience studying dozens of individual 
cases, I have seen few, if any, universal truths that apply across cases. Here, we 
suspected that only a few, if any, traits would predict outcomes across three 
distinct sets of case facts, and we predicted that those would be a combination 
of traits, not simple demographic markers. 
Scholars have studied the question of whether juror demographics influ-
ence jury verdicts for decades. The studies attempt to answer a basic question. 
If all jurors see the same case, “What, then, accounts for variation among jurors 
in response to the same case? One possibility is that there are powerful, but as 
of yet unmeasured, individual differences that could be identified in advance 
and used to inform choices during jury selection.”35 
The answers to this question depend on whom you ask. Many trial lawyers 
believed for years that certain jurors were pro-plaintiff while others were pro-
                                                        
34  Hyatt Browning Shirkey, Note, Last Attorney to the Jury Box Is a Rotten Egg: Overcom-
ing Psychological Hurdles in the Order of Presentation at Trial, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 
582–83 (2011). 
35  Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 717, 738 (2006). 
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defendant. Myths like “black jurors vote for plaintiffs” led to peremptory 
strikes by defendants. And the belief that business owners were bad for plain-
tiffs did the same. But there was very little empirical evidence to support these 
conclusions. 
As researchers have noted for some time, basic demographics may matter 
in some cases, but that neither indicates they matter in all cases, nor does it 
suggest that directionality is the same in all cases. Indeed, in my own private 
work studying cases for lawyers, I have found that it is highly case specific. For 
example, gender may or may not matter, and even when it does, it can cut ei-
ther way. A plaintiff should sometimes favor men while other times she should 
favor women. Due to the inherent complexity in cases, there are few, if any, 
generalizable rules as to whether demographics can be predictive. After all, a 
case about a Ford Explorer that rolled over might on its face turn on whether 
the vehicle was “crashworthy.”36 But that does not mean that it is irrelevant 
whether the driver was a single mom on her way home from working her sec-
ond job, or a male, wealthy CEO driving home from a strip club. One could 
imagine that gender, marital status, parental status, or a variety of other factors 
might matter in those cases, and in different ways. The same could be said of 
two slip-and-fall cases, one involving an hourly Hispanic worker and one in-
volving a white neurosurgeon who fell at the hospital. 
This likely explains why the research on whether demographics matter is 
so mixed. Two questions are sometimes conflated: (1) Can basic demographics 
or voir dire answers predict which jurors will favor plaintiffs, defendants, the 
prosecution, or the defense in general, and (2) Can basic demographics or voir 
dire answers predict how jurors will vote in a particular case? The answers are, 
in order, largely no, and yes.37 
The research largely seems to support these conclusions.38 A variety of 
studies look at a single case or a small subset of cases and find some difference 
in demographics. For example, in a car accident case involving clear liability, 
white women awarded lower damages to the plaintiff.39 But the case was not 
tested with different plaintiffs or defendants.40 Other reviews of jury studies 
cite a number of different studies suggesting that race impacts verdicts, and 
how it impacts verdicts depends on a variety of factors, including the race of 
the defendant in criminal trials.41 And Golding and co-authors show gender 
                                                        
36  See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Moore, 905 N.E.2d 418, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), vacated by 
TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc. v. Moore, 936 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 2010). 
37  See infra Part II. 
38  See infra Part III. 
39  James H. Underwood III et al., Demographics in Civil Trials: Biases and Implications, 7 
J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 33, 38–39 (2009). 
40  Id. at 33. 
41  Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of 
Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 81 (1993). 
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composition affects deliberations and may affect jury level decision making 
processes in child abuse cases and that gender affects perceptions of elder 
abuse.42 
Studies that look at a broader set of cases tend to find that demographics 
are not particularly predictive. For example, Bornstein & Rajki found that be-
havior attitudes are better predictors than demographics.43 And in medical mal-
practice and product liability verdicts, Rose and Vidmar found no difference in 
awards associated with juror demographics.44 
So, the takeaway from the literature is that demographics and beliefs might 
matter in individual cases but predicting how they will matter is difficult. And 
it is dangerous and likely wrong to conclude that because a particular trait is 
predictive in one case, it will be in others. 
Based on the literature, it was unlikely that general demographics would be 
predictive across all three cases in this study. It was possible, however, that a 
combination of beliefs might be. 
B. Hypothesis 2: Belief mirroring will impact jurors. Jurors exposed to case 
frames that align with their self-reported beliefs will vote for liability more 
often than those who do not, despite holding case facts constant. 
Although I believe in jurors and juries, my working hypothesis was that be-
lief mirroring would make at least some difference in verdict rates. I hypothe-
sized that framing the argument in language familiar to the jury and that 
aligned closely to juror beliefs would influence liability rates, though I ex-
pected the effect would be relatively small. 
However, as described below, there is not accord among scholars or attor-
neys. 
1. Jurors as Lemmings 
Although the overall conclusion of this paper and the overall view of this 
author is that juries do careful work and can be trusted, I must confess that even 
my own work and the work of my co-authors has shown that jurors are suscep-
tible to cognitive biases.45 In “Countering the Plaintiff’s Anchor” we demon-
                                                        
42  Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Effect of Gender in the Perception of Elder Physical 
Abuse in Court, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 605, 612 (2005); Jonathan M. Golding et al., The 
Impact of Mock Jury Gender Composition on Deliberations and Conviction Rates in a Child 
Sexual Assault Trial, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 182, 182 (2007). 
43  Brian H. Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, Extra-Legal Factors and Product Liability: The 
Influence of Mock Jurors’ Demographic Characteristics and Intuitions About the Cause of 
an Injury, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 127, 130 (1994). 
44  Mary R. Rose & Neil Vidmar, The Bronx “Bronx Jury”: A Profile of Civil Jury Awards 
in New York Counties, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1889, 1897 (2002). 
45  See supra Abstract. 
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strated that, among other things, anchors are irresistible.46 Others have shown 
that jurors struggle to separate liability facts from damage facts.47 Jessica Sa-
lerno has hypothesized that juror emotions influence decision-making in nega-
tive ways.48 Salerno has analyzed studies demonstrating that showing jurors 
bloody photos, even when those photos do not relate to the case, causes jurors 
to convict criminal defendants more often.49 Even more troubling, studies show 
that jurors who saw the bloody photos in color showed signs of anger and is-
sued more punitive sentences than jurors shown the exact same photos in black 
and white.50 
Beyond jury studies, there is also ample social science research suggesting 
that people are, as one book called it, “Predictably Irrational.”51 Daniel Kahne-
man, perhaps the leading cognitive scientist of the last forty years, provides a 
list of some of these cognitive fallacies in Thinking, Fast and Slow.52 I have se-
lected some of those cognitive fallacies that would suggest jurors are subject to 
manipulation, including the manipulations tested in this study. 
One such cognitive bias is confirmation bias—a phenomenon in which 
people seek out information that supports their views.53 And, even more gener-
ally, a process in which jurors are predisposed to find information consistent 
with the premise of questions and presentations.54 Kahneman provides an ex-
ample, noting that if someone is asked, “Is Sam friendly?” it will produce dif-
ferent response than, “Is Sam unfriendly?”—this is an effect of associate 
memory.55 The question predisposes the person to find certain facts in their 
mind.56 
                                                        
46  John Campbell et al., Countering the Plaintiff’s Anchor: Jury Simulations to Evaluate 
Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L. REV. 543, 546 (2016). 
47  See, e.g., Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judg-
ments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 603–04 (1999) (not-
ing that participants were told liability and compensatory damages of over $24,000,000 had 
been awarded before being asked to award punitive damages); Mollie W. Marti & Roselle L. 
Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask for: The Effect of Anchors on Personal-Injury Damages 
Awards, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 91, 94 (2000) (noting that participants were told that 
liability was already determined in the plaintiff’s favor and that all damages besides pain and 
suffering had already been awarded). 
48  Jessica M. Salerno & Bette L. Bottoms, Emotional Evidence and Jurors’ Judgments: The 
Promise of Neuroscience for Informing Psychology and Law, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 273, 274 
(2009). 
49  Id. at 277. 
50  Id. 
51  See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE 
OUR DECISIONS (2008). 
52  KAHNEMAN, supra note 33, at 158, 199, 250, 345. 
53  Id. at 81. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
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Kahneman also chronicles the process of substituting questions.57 Put 
simply, when people are faced with complex questions, they often answer an 
easier one.58 The target question is the assessment the person intends to pro-
duce.59 The heuristic question is the question the person answers instead.60 For 
example, when asked to pick a president, rather than spend dozens of hours re-
viewing candidates, many will answer an easier question such as “which candi-
date belongs to my party,” or “who are my friends voting for,” or “who seems 
like someone I’d enjoy having over for dinner”?61 
Other cognitive fallacies that could suggest jurors will be manipulated in 
the current study include the halo effect.62 This occurs when, a person knows 
one good thing about someone and assumes other good things about them.63 A 
related phenomenon, relevant to the study, would be to assume if someone ex-
presses ideas similar to yours, they should be trusted, and their client should 
win.64 
One final bias worth mentioning is the “affect heuristic.” This heuristic 
suggests that “[y]our political preference determines the arguments that you 
find compelling.”65 
Putting these various heuristics together, a fair reading of Kahneman is that 
facts are malleable. Indeed, he even provides an example of this.66 Kahneman 
suggests that if you tell people that the counties with the lowest per capita inci-
dence of kidney cancer are rural and found in historically Republican states 
found in the Midwest, South, and West, people will often assume they know 
why.67 They will conclude that clean living is the likely explanation.68 But if 
you tell someone that the counties with the highest per capita incidence of kid-
ney cancer are rural counties in historically Republican states found in the 
Midwest, South, and West, people will assume it is because of smoking, poor 
health care services, and fatty diets.69 Both explanations cannot be true. But 
                                                        
57  Id. at 97. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  See id. at 98. 
62  Id. at 82. 
63  Id. 
64  See id. 
65  Id. at 103. See generally Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, 177 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL 
RES. 1333, 1333 (2007). 
66  KAHNEMAN, supra note 33, at 109. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at 109–10. 
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people’s need to produce cohesive stories and explanations will fill in the 
gaps.70 
Juror scholars have echoed this, anticipating that jurors can be swayed, for 
example, by opening statements precisely because those statements can exploit 
cognitive biases.71 Diamond wrote, “Both lawyer lore and social science theory 
anticipate an influential role for opening statements.”72 She suggested “Open-
ing statements can create thematic frameworks, or schemata, that guide jurors 
during the trial and deliberations in their observation, organization, and retriev-
al of evidence.”73 
The view that jurors can be swayed by cognitive biases has been flamed by 
media reports and the Chamber of Commerce’s efforts to demonize lawsuits.74 
The Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform claims that excessive 
litigation costs the American economy billions of dollars per year.75 In 2017 
alone, the Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform spent $22.7 mil-
lion lobbying the federal government.76 The American Association of Justice 
has countered the Institute for Legal Reform, stating that the organization is 
exploiting this information solely to restrict individual access to the legal sys-
tem.77 
The famous McDonald’s hot coffee case is often considered to be the be-
ginning of an era where “frivolous lawsuits” began to gain popularity in the 
United States.78 However, the documentary “Hot Coffee” discredits this con-
ception.79 The documentary explores the damage and suffering that the plaintiff 
                                                        
70  Kahneman actually shares this story to discuss the rule of small numbers. Namely, the 
reason both statements can be true is because rural counties have small sample sizes, allow-
ing a few cases to skew the percentages. But the story neatly demonstrates how cognitive 
biases can cause individuals to jump to conclusions. Id. at 110–11. 
71  Diamond, supra note 35, at 742. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Staff, Coffee, Lip Balm, and Cycling Make the List of the 10 Most 
Ridiculous Lawsuits of 2016, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Dec. 29, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://www.us 
chamber.com/series/above-the-fold/coffee-lip-balm-and-cycling-make-the-list-the-10-most-
ridiculous-lawsuits-2016 [https://perma.cc/5BRS-WZDG] (The Chamber has regularly pro-
moted the idea that ridiculous lawsuits are common, when in fact there is no evidence to 
suggest this is true). 
75  Lawsuit Abuse Impact, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, https://www.instituteforl 
egalreform.com/issues/lawsuit-abuse-impact [https://perma.cc/S6BM-HU5E] (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2018). 
76  U.S. Chamber of Commerce Client Profile: Summary, 2017, OPENSECRETS.ORG: CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000019798&year 
=2017 [https://perma.cc/GRY7-8E44] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018). 
77  AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I SUE: EXPOSING THE LAWSUIT-HAPPY 
HYPOCRITES OF U.S. CHAMBER’S INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM 15 (2011). 
78  HOT COFFEE (HBO 2011). 
79  Id. 
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endured after being severely burned by hot coffee served by McDonald’s.80 
“Hot Coffee” exposed that the litigation was not a scheme for lawyers to get 
rich, but was a vehicle to compensate the plaintiff for the medical expenses she 
accumulated as a result of her injuries.81 
2. Jurors as Lions 
Some of the leading researchers on jurors—true giants of the field—
conclude that overall, jurors are pretty good at what they do.82 
Valerie Hans is a prolific studier of juries. She has investigated the claim 
that juries produce arbitrary damage awards.83 And although she concedes the 
numbers awarded are not perfectly consistent across cases, she argues that they 
are nonetheless coherent.84 “Hans-Reyna model suggests that there is an under-
lying coherence in people’s judgments about the severity of plaintiffs’ damages 
and liability of defendants; at the level of the gist, award judgments make 
sense.”85 
Hans also weighs in more generally on juries in other articles, noting “if 
one views all of the evidence gathered through diverse methodologies collec-
tively, the scholarly work shows that juries, in general, and civil juries, in par-
ticular, perform reasonably well in understanding trial evidence, and in using it 
to reach their verdicts.”86 
Others agree. “Analyzing the factors that contribute to jury verdicts, re-
searchers have discovered that evidentiary strength, whether it is rated by judg-
es or by jurors, is by far the most important factor explaining the trial’s out-
come.”87 Others note that much of the to do about runaway juries is not 
supported at all.88 
And Shari Diamond notes that throughout her work on the Arizona Jury 
Project, it became clear that juries pay a great deal of attention to the jury in-
                                                        
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Diamond & Rose, supra note 6, at 278. 
83  Valerie P. Hans, What’s It Worth? Jury Damage Awards as Community Judgments, 55 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 963 (2014). 
84  Valerie F. Reyna et al., The Gist of Juries: Testing a Model of Damage Award Decision 
Making, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L., 280, 282–83 (2015). 
85  Id. at 291. 
86  Valerie P. Hans, Empowering the Active Jury: A Genuine Tort Reform, 13 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 39, 42 (2008). 
87  Id. 
88  Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Per-
ceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 788, 789 (2000) 
(Arguing generally that juries have always been questioned but that civil verdicts, awards, 
and the award of punitive damages have been relatively consistent). 
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structions, that they carefully work through the evidence, and that they typical-
ly correct errors in recall during deliberation.89 
Perhaps Eddie Greene, who has studied juries for decades and contributed 
mightily to the literature, put it best: “[T]he intellectual incompetence of the 
civil jury has been vastly exaggerated.”90 
Many trial lawyers seem to agree, in particular, with the idea that jurors 
decide cases based on facts, not personality or through cognitive bias. For ex-
ample, Randi McGinn is the former president of the Inner Circle—the most 
elite group of plaintiff trial lawyers in the country. She wrote a book on how to 
try cases, which relates what she learned from trying cases.91 “There was no 
magic oratory, special power suit, or precise hand gestures that would make me 
a great trial lawyer. It was all in how I prepared my cases.”92 
She also notes important advice handed down to her, and many other law-
yers.93 “You make more money from the cases you turn down than the cases 
that you take.”94 Implicit in this advice is the idea that lawyers cannot make bad 
cases good, no matter how talented they may be.95 Jurors care about facts.96 
Even in popular culture there has been a pushback against the narrative of 
runaway juries. The documentary “Hot Coffee” explores whether lawsuits are 
really get rich quick schemes.97 It dives into the facts of the McDonald’s hot 
coffee case, revealing the plaintiff underwent multiple surgeries, she had third 
degree burns on her genitals, she originally asked McDonald’s only to pay for 
her medical bills (but they refused), the coffee was far hotter than industry 
standards, and McDonald’s knew its coffee caused severe burns but did nothing 
about it.98 
In sum, the literature, lawyers, and cultural perceptions of jurors are mixed. 
There are solid arguments for why belief mirroring could influence jurors, and 
there is some evidence that it may be trumped by the evidence itself. On net, I 
predicted at the outset that belief mirroring would move jurors, but the effects 
would be small. 
                                                        
89  Shari Diamond, The Deliberations of Real Juries, Presentation at the Denver Empirical 
Justice Institute Spring 2017 Speaker Series (Apr. 20, 2017). 
90  Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, 52 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 228 (1989). 
91  See RANDI MCGINN, CHANGING LAWS, SAVING LIVES: HOW TO TAKE ON CORPORATE 
GIANTS AND WIN (2014). 
92  Id. at 44. 
93  See generally id. at 8. 
94  Id. 
95  See id. 
96  See id. at 6–8. 
97  HOT COFFEE, supra note 78. 
98  Id. 
19 NEV. L.J.187, CAMPBELL 1/28/2019  12:41 PM 
Fall 2018] LEMMINGS OR LIONS 203 
 
C. Hypothesis 3: Jurors will respond best when the frame is introduced prior 
to reading the evidence. 
Literature on primacy dates back to at least 1925, when Lund noted that 
ideas introduced first are more likely to be believed than those introduced lat-
er.99 At its core, primacy is really about memory.100 “The primacy effect is the 
tendency for individuals without neurological impairment to show enhanced 
memory for items presented at the beginning of a list relative to items pre-
sented in the middle of the list.”101 However, because memory and attention 
shape perception, the primacy effect often means that information presented 
early is more powerful than information presented later.102 
However, in trial settings there is another effect that can matter, and that is 
recency.103 Recency suggests that the last thing a person hears will stick with 
them, making it more salient.104 In a study of criminal trials, Engel and his co-
authors concluded that recency effects dominated.105 This notion was so true 
that the authors suggest that letting the prosecution have the last word in crimi-
nal trials prejudices criminal defendants.106 
Among scholars, trial lawyers and jury consultants, there is no shortage of 
opinions on these issues. Diamond wrote, “Both lawyer lore and social science 
theory anticipate an influential role for opening statements.”107 She suggested, 
“Opening statements may create thematic frameworks, or schemata, that guide 
jurors during the trial and deliberations in their observation, organization and 
retrieval of evidence.”108 
A jury consultant argues that “because jurors begin to assign blame early in 
a trial, defense attorneys need to pay close attention to how information is or-
dered in opening statements and during the direct examination.”109 
                                                        
99  Mark T. Gerard, Primacy and Recency Effects in Trial, LITIG. GROUP, https://www.litigati 
ongroup.com/2015/03/01/winter-2015/ [https://perma.cc/MZ65-SF52] (last visited Sept. 21, 
2018). 
100  SAUL KASSIN ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 137, 227–28 (9th ed. 2014). 
101  Angela K. Troyer, Primacy Effect, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 
(Jeffrey Kreutzer et al. eds., 2017). 
102  KASSIN, supra note 100, at 137, 227–28. 
103  TOM RILEY & PETER C. RILEY, CIVIL LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 64:7 (2018). 
104  Id. 
105  Christoph Engel et al., Defendant Should Have the Last Word: Experimentally Manipu-
lating Order and Provisional Assessment of the Facts in Criminal Procedure, MAX PLANCK 
INST., Nov. 2017., at 11, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3077855 [https://perma.cc/CFT5-LG9V]. 
106  Id. at 2. 
107  Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 17, 26 (1996). 
108  Id. at 27. 
109  Bill Kanasky, The Primacy and Recency Effects: The Secret Weapons of Opening State-
ments, 2014 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. at 26. 
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He advocates for opening statements that work more like Hollywood mov-
ies, noting that many movies start with brutal murders, war scenes, or other at-
tention grabbing devices.110 
And some scholars, without empirical evidence, have even called for com-
pletely reworking civil jury trials to keep plaintiffs from going first because it 
prejudices the case against the defendant.111 “[O]nce a fact-finder starts to form 
a working hypothesis to explain the facts of the case, they will be biased to-
wards interpreting new facts in a way that confirms that theory.”112 Spottswood 
argues for a third party who would determine the order of evidence to avoid 
“[o]rder[ing] effects” that “are not easily eliminated.”113 
D. Hypothesis 4: Jurors will respond similarly to belief mirroring cross 
political orientations 
Almost all social scientists agree that humans engage in motivated reason-
ing, resulting in judgments that are not fully consistent with facts.114 But, as 
discussed in this section, there is a persistent and growing debate among social 
scientists about how this happens. Motivated reasoning can be defined as a sit-
uation in which people “conform assessments of information to some goal or 
end [that is] extrinsic to accuracy.”115 
Some scholars believe in the Bounded Rationality Thesis (BRT).116 At its 
core, this theory posits that people engage in motivated reasoning because they 
fail to engage in System 2 thinking (active, critical thinking), instead relying on 
System 1 (quick, intuition based decisions).117 The reason, according to BRT, 
that people get things wrong is because they are failing to rigorously examine 
them.118 Implicit in BRT is the idea that more System 2 thinking would reduce 
confirmation biases and motivated reasoning.119 
                                                        
110  Id. at 27. 
111  See Mark Spottswood, Ordering Proof: Beyond Adversarial and Inquisitorial Trial 
Structures, 83 TENN. L. REV. 291, 291 (2015). 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 324. 
114  Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection 2–3 n.1 (Cul-





115  Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT 
& DECISION MAKING 407, 408 (2013). 
116  Kahan, supra note 114, at 4. 
117  Kahan, supra note 115, at 409. 
118  Id. 
119  Kahan, supra note 114, at 4. 
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A second theory, which has gained some popularity in recent years, is the 
Neo-authoritarian Personality Thesis (NPT), which suggests that “the person-
ality correlates of right-wing ideology”—dogmatism, need for closure, aversion 
to complexity, and the like—produce an overreliance on System 1 thinking.120 
Thus, NPT predicts that conservatives are disproportionately affected by moti-
vated reasoning and the like because they are not open minded and do not self-
reflect.121 NPT is, by definition, a subspecies of BRT, as it suggests that an ab-
sence of System 2 thinking is the culprit, but it predicts that the effects will be 
most pronounced in certain conservatives.122 And it argues that the lack of Sys-
tem 2 thinking is due to particular traits and beliefs.123 
There have been some studies that support this view.124 But others have 
suggested instead that anyone who is dogmatically political is more close-
minded.125 
The final theory that attempts to explain motivated reasoning is the Expres-
sive Rationality Thesis (ERT).126 This theory proposes that motivated reasoning 
is not limited to those who are close-minded or do not like complexity.127 Ra-
ther, most people will tend to hold beliefs that foster their connection to “identi-
ty-defining groups”; it suggests that “individuals who are disposed and 
equipped to use high-level, conscious information processing can be expected 
to make the effort to do so more readily in defense of, than in opposition to, be-
liefs that predominate in their groups.”128 Put even more simply, ERT suggests 
that most people, conservative or not, will rationalize beliefs that benefit them 
by keeping them aligned with their identity groups.129 System 2 thinking will 
not save them.130 And this is not because they are close-minded or afraid of 
complexity.131 It is driven instead by a normal tendency to promote rather than 
frustrate their individual ends.132 
“Whereas BRT views ideological polarization as evidence of a deficit in 
System 2 reasoning capacities, ERT predicts that the reliable employment of 
                                                        
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. 
124  See generally Ravi Iyer et al., Understanding Libertarian Morality: The Psychological 
Dispositions of Self-Identified Libertarians, PLOS ONE, Aug. 2012, at 1. 
125  See generally Alan S. Gerber et al., Personality and the Strength and Direction of Parti-
san Identification, 34 POL. BEHAV. 653, 653 (2012). 
126  Kahan, supra note 114, at 5. 
127  See id. at 6. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. at 5–6. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. at 6. 
132  Id. 
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more effortful, conscious information processing will magnify the polarizing 
effects of identity-protective cognition.”133 
In a recent study, Kahan of the Cultural Cognition Project, made signifi-
cant progress in proving ERT.134 He conducted an experiment that measured 
whether individuals were reflective and self-critical.135 He then measured how 
those participants responded to information that aligned with their political 
views.136 BRT predicts that self-critical people will be manipulated less by in-
formation that confirms their views because they will filter it through System 
2.137 NPT suggests that conservatives will be most impacted by the information 
(and that conservatives will score lower on the reflective tests).138 ERT sug-
gests that as people become more reflective, they will be more susceptible to 
information that confirms their beliefs.139 The study, in sum, supported ERT.140 
Higher scores of reflection correlated to more motivated reasoning, and con-
servatives did not score lower than others on reflection.141 
Kahan’s work on ERT suggests that jurors across the spectrum of political 
affiliation will respond similarly to belief mirroring.142 It was beyond the objec-
tives of the current study to measure whether jurors are more or less reflec-
tive.143 
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A.  Hypotheses 
1. Juror responses to questions that measure views on various issues and 
place jurors on scale measuring political orientation will predict juror 
outcomes. 
2. Jurors will respond better to cases framed in language that mirrors their 
characteristics and reported beliefs. 
3. Jurors will respond best when the frame is introduced first, as opposed 
to when framing occurs only in closing argument. 
4. Conservative and progressive jurors will show similar levels of moti-
vated reasoning and cultural cognition, consistent with ERT theory. 
                                                        
133  Id. at 7. 
134  Id. at 5–7. 
135  Id. at 8. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. at 21. 
138  Id. at 14. 
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B. Stimulus 
Jurors were randomly assigned to one of three factual scenarios. Those fac-
tual scenarios presented three different civil cases. This was done to mitigate 
any risk that framing is more effective in specific case types. Case 1 was an 
employment discrimination case. Case 2 was a personal injury case. Case 3 
presented a dispute about whether an insurer complied with its fiduciary duties 
to an insured. 
Each case was based on a real case that occurred in the last ten years, to 
ensure realism. The case facts were also crafted using summaries created by the 
attorneys who handled the cases. The cases were from three different attorneys. 
These summaries were abbreviated versions of presentations used in private 
mock jury studies on the cases. This ensured a factual richness in the cases and 
eliminated the risk that the researcher would create cases different from those 
actually litigated. The cases were chosen because they were expected to pro-
duce win rates that approached 50/50, making manipulation of jurors more like-
ly to occur and be detected. 
The effort to produce reasonably close cases was largely successful. The 
three cases produced win rates of 59.1 percent, 58.2 percent, and 63.1 percent. 
Based on an expected average reading speed of 150 words, scripts were de-
signed to be within two minutes of the same length when compared to one an-
other. 
Basic summaries of the cases follow. The complete case scripts are includ-
ed in the appendix. 
1. Base Cases 
Case 1—Employment Discrimination—Plaintiff (Ellen) was the store 
manager of a grocery store. She suffered a poor health inspection. She contact-
ed a friend who was a state representative, asking that he call the health inspec-
tor and get him back out to re-inspect since the infractions were repaired. The 
grocery store fired Ellen, asserting she violated internal policies and embar-
rassed the store by contacting a state representative. Ellen asserted that she was 
previously harassed by her male regional manager, that she suspected they were 
trying to get rid of her, and that this caused her to want an immediate re-
inspection. She asserted she violated no rules. She also offered evidence that 
men in the organization engaged in similar behavior but were not fired. 
The facts presented to mock jurors in this case were 425 words long. The 
win rate for this case was 59.1 percent. 
Case 2—Personal Injury—The plaintiff in this case was the spouse of Mr. 
Flores. He worked on a barge loading giant steel coils that weighed roughly 
68,000 pounds each. Mr. Flores helped provide guidance to the crane operator, 
who sat the coils onto wood saddles that held the coils in place. The barge be-
gan to rock on the day of the accident, the coils broke loose, and they crushed 
Mr. Flores foot, causing him to lose it. Mr. Flores argued that the manufacturer 
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of the saddles was liable because they used an inferior wood and constructed 
defective saddles that they knew or should have known could crush and allow 
the coils to move. He offered expert evidence. The manufacturer asserted that 
Mr. Flores was required to nail down the saddles as they were installed. They 
asserted that his failure to do so let the saddles shift, causing the coils to roll. 
The facts presented in this case were 750 words long. The win rate for this 
case 58.2 percent. 
Case 3—Insurance Dispute—Susan Sikes went to her insurance agent to 
obtain basic automobile coverage, homeowner coverage, and extra coverage 
called excess coverage. She recently inherited money and wanted it protected in 
case of an accident. Years earlier she had a friend who was in an accident, did 
not have enough coverage, and paid out of her own pocket. She explained this 
to the agent. According to Ms. Sikes she asked for extra insurance that would 
“kick in if either her or her husband were hurt or if they hurt someone else.” 
Ms. Sikes was later in a car accident. When she filed for excess coverage, it did 
not exist. The policy she signed each year did not contain it. She argued the in-
surer breached its fiduciary duty to sell her the coverage she requested. The in-
surer asserted that Ms. Sikes signed the policy each year and should have 
known that it did not contain such coverage. 
The facts presented in this case were 504 words long. The win rate for this 
case 63.1 percent. 
2. Belief Mirroring and Primacy/Recency 
In addition to being randomly assigned to one of the three base cases, ju-
rors were also randomized in two other ways. First, they were randomly as-
signed to read either an opening statement, a closing argument, or no statement 
at all. Second, if they were assigned to an opening statement or closing argu-
ment, they saw one of three types: a progressive spin on the case, a conserva-
tive spin on the case, or a blended spin on the case. These “frames” for the case 
were vetted by practicing attorneys and created by the author, an experienced 
trial attorney. They were designed to mirror the beliefs of some jurors, there-
fore making them more appealing. Examples of the closing arguments, for Case 
1 (the employment discrimination case) follows. 
a. Conservative Belief Mirroring  
Let me talk to you about this case. 
You have heard the facts. As a juror, as our founding fathers envisioned, 
you now get to decide what happens. You, and only you, have that power. No 
matter how dysfunctional anything else is in our country, the jury system con-
tinues. It gives each of you the power to enforce the rule of law. That is exactly 
how our Constitution envisioned it. 
Ellen is tough, hardworking, and loyal. She worked for the same company 
for fifteen years. That is so rare these days, in a time when many people think 
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they have an absolute right to a promotion at a company, and if they do not get 
it, they leave or complain. 
Ellen is not a whiner either. And she does not expect that the workplace 
will be “politically correct.” During her time at the company, there were men 
who said things she did not like. But that was okay. She put her head down and 
worked harder. She trusted that merit matters, and loyalty is rewarded. 
But the company was not loyal. It did not follow the rule of law and it was 
not just or fair. It fired Ellen for showing initiative. She contacted a politician to 
get help showing she fixed a problem. What is wrong with that? The company 
is acting like it does not know that in the real world, you have to have some 
grit. You have to work for what you want. Ellen did not lie. She did not hide 
anything. She just worked to fix it. And the company pounced, using it as an 
excuse to fire her. People have to be personally accountable. So do companies. 
And this company messed up. 
What it did is illegal. And as a jury, Ellen asks you to do your duty, enforce 
the law, and find the company liable. 
Length: 307 words 
b. Liberal Belief Mirroring 
Let’s talk together about this case. 
Juries exist in part so that minority groups and those in protected classes 
cannot be abused. It is the role of the jury to stand up for the least among us. 
And in cases like this, it is the role of the jury to say that equality matters, and 
that companies cannot bully their employees, just because of their gender. 
Ellen is a victim of a large corporation that thinks it is above the law and 
acts like it is still the 1950s. Ellen was an honest, caring, kind employee who 
worked hard for her company. She sacrificed time away from her children. She 
worked through stress and hard times. She endured a pattern of discrimination. 
She faced the same struggle so many do. She was called “moody” and her 
manager assumed she could not make “tough decisions.” 
Then, when she was decisive, working to get her store in order, she was 
fired for it. She was fired for taking initiative, but men who did the same were 
not. The corporation did not think about how firing Ellen would risk her home, 
or perhaps move her kids to a new school. It thought only about advancing em-
ployees who were in the good old boy system, whether they deserved it or not. 
That violates the law. And just as importantly, it violates our common be-
lief that all people should be treated equally. Please stand up for Ellen, as only 
you can. Find the company liable. 
Length: 248 words 
c. Blended Belief Mirroring 
Let me talk to you about this case. 
19 NEV. L.J.187, CAMPBELL 1/28/2019  12:41 PM 
210 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1  
 
You have heard the facts. As a juror, as our founding fathers envisioned, 
you now get to decide what happens. You, and only you, have that power. No 
matter how dysfunctional anything else is in our country, the jury system con-
tinues. It gives each of you the power to enforce the rule of law. That is exactly 
how our Constitution envisioned it. 
That power exists in part so that minority groups and those in protected 
classes cannot be abused. It is the role of the jury to stand up for the least 
among us. And in cases like this it is the role of the jury to say that equality 
matters, and that companies cannot bully their employees, just because of their 
gender. 
Ellen is tough, hardworking, and loyal. She worked for the same company 
for fifteen years. That is so rare these days, in a time when many people think 
they have an absolute right to a promotion at a company, and if they do not get 
it, they leave or complain. 
And what did Ellen get for her hard work? She got treated like it was still 
the 1950s. She was an honest, kind, caring employee who sacrificed time away 
from her family, especially her children, to get ahead. Despite the sacrifices, 
when she acted decisively, instead of being rewarded like the men were, she 
was fired. She was a victim of the good old boy system that labels women 
“moody” and believes they cannot make “tough decisions.” 
This whole decision got approved by some bureaucrat who never worked 
in the real world and did not understand that it takes grit and toughness to suc-
ceed in a company. Instead of rewarding Ellen for being personally accountable 
and working hard, she was punished by a PC culture. 
What the company did violated the law. It is your right and responsibility 
to enforce the rule of law in order to protect those trampled by greedy compa-
nies and affected by discrimination. Please find the company liable. 
Length: 341 words 
3. Defense Response 
The defense response was held static. Each is available in the appendix.  
4. Overview of Experimental Conditions 
The result of the various manipulations produced the following 21 condi-
tions: 
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5. Voir Dire and Liability 
a. Voir Dire and Demographic Questions 
Jurors were asked to answer a variety of voir dire questions, included in the 
appendix. Some were basic Likert scales, typically used to allow people to self-
rank themselves on a conservative to progressive scale. Others were questions 
that are sometimes asked in voir dire. Others asked the jurors’ opinion on 
themes that appeared in the script, such as bullying, political correctness, pro-
tection of marginalized groups, hard work, and personal accountability. Basic 
demographic information was also collected. 
b. Liability 
Liability was reduced to a very simple instruction to avoid unnecessary 
complexity. The liability questions are included below: 
Case 1—You must decide if the company is liable for discrimination. 
In doing so, consider this instruction. 
If gender played a substantial role in the decision to terminate an employ-
ee, then the company discriminated. If gender did not play a substantial role, 
the company did not discriminate. 
Do you find the company liable for discrimination? 
Case 2—You must decide if the company that provided the saddles was 
negligent. 
Negligence is defined as failing to exercise the same level of care that an 
ordinary person would, in the same or similar circumstances. 
Was the company negligent? 
Case 3—You must decide if the company that sold Ms. Sikes the insurance 
breached its duty of care. 
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The duty of care in this case was to put Ms. Sikes’s interests above the 
companies. That is a fiduciary duty. And more generally, the company had a 
duty to act in a reasonably careful way to provide her coverage. 
Did the company breach its duty of care? 
6. Respondents 
One thousand thirty-six jurors were recruited on Amazon Turk (mTurk), 
using TurkPrime as an interface and Qualtrics as the survey platform. Mturk 
has become a large and robust platform for social science research, with proven 
reliability through the replication of many known results.144 However, the plat-
form requires great care to ensure meaningful results. Randomization was suc-
cessful, with no significant variations across conditions. We screened for par-
ticipants that were “jury eligible,” meaning residents of the United States over 
age eighteen who could read, write, and speak English. For quality control, we 
also screen for respondents who had previously been approved for payment in 
previous studies, and therefore had reasonably high approval ratings on the 
platform. Subjects were paid four dollars to complete the experiment online. 
All subjects consented in accordance with Institutional Review Board require-
ments. 
Using participants’ unique identifiers, we excluded anyone who participat-
ed in previous studies that use the same video. We paid at a rate near the mini-
mum wage and sufficient to recruit enough workers to complete data collection 
in a matter of hours, minimizing any risk that workers could communicate with 
one another on chat boards, thereby “unblinding” the experiment. 
Attention checks were embedded in the survey. For example, in a list of 
questions asking people to select from a Likert Scale, a question was included 
instructing participants to select “strongly agree.” 
                                                        
144  See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com [https://perma.cc/4DK8-7ZJR] 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2018). 
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The basic breakdown of the jury by demographics showed a jury that was 
relatively similar to the national population. The charts below show some of the 
basic characteristics. 
 
The mean age was thirty-five, with a minimum age of eighteen, and a max-
imum of seventy-four. 
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We piloted the study by recruiting one hundred people. This ensured effec-
tive randomization and that there were no obvious problems with design. It also 
allowed us to make sure cases were producing results near 50/50. 
Finally, it allowed us to begin to see whether framing effects, ordering ef-
fects, and outcomes predicted by characteristics of the jurors were emerging. 
To check for these effects, we: 
Modeled the finding of liability on case and response to each attitude ques-
tion. 
Fit a factor model to estimate underlying characteristics that accounted for 
the attitude responses. Then we modeled the finding of liability on case and 
each factor. 
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Modeled the finding of liability on case and response to each attitude ques-
tion interacted with each frame type in order to identify the effect of framing on 
respondents reporting different levels of support for each attitude. 
Modeled the finding of liability on case and each factor interacted with 
each frame type in order to identify the effect of framing on respondents having 
different levels of each factor.145 
This was done to narrow research questions and to conform to best practic-
es of crafting clear research questions prior to the study. By identifying the trait 
combinations and the basic demographic characteristics we would observe and 
measure, we avoided p-hacking—the search for results that appear statistically 
significant on their face but are not—and reduced the risk of multiple testing 
error. 
After the pilot, we ran the full study. There were 1,036 valid responses. 
Tests of associations found in the pilot study were run on these data. The data 
were combined to identify associations that the small pilot study lacked power 
to detect. 
A. Result for Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis was that juror responses to questions that measure 
views on various issues and place jurors on scale measuring political orienta-
tion will predict juror outcomes. 
We checked several jury types and answers to specific individual questions 
that our pilot suggested may be predictive. 
The responses of primary interest are the ones that were statistically signif-
icant or borderline significant in the pilot without multiple test correction.146 
These were tested on the study data by applying likelihood ratio tests to the 
model with liability dependent on case to each model of liability depending on 
case and a response from the list. 
                                                        
145  For those who are not statistically trained, in essence, we did the following. First, we ran 
a test with 100 people. We wanted to make sure the survey worked and that the cases were 
producing liability rates close to 50/50. If all jurors voted the same way, we could analyze 
whether our arguments changed the votes. Then, we ran some initial statistical models on the 
pilot to look for ways that attitudes, or combinations of attitudes, were predicting results. We 
“interacted” attitudes with the frames—meaning we checked various attitudes of jurors 
against our conservative, liberal, or blended frames to see if patterns were emerging in how 
frames impacted specific juror attitudes. All of this let us narrow what we looked for in the 
final data. This is a best practice. Otherwise, with enough data, you can always find some 
effect to result. We wanted to make sure we were honestly and fairly looking for effects. 
146  The abbreviated names for these were “political_social,” “political_fiscal,” “conserva-
tive,” “gender,” “constit_good,” “faith_over_fact,” “victim_whiny_bad,” “compas-
sion_for_diff_good,” “need_more_respect_for_bluecollar,” “too_pc.” 
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Those that remained significant at the p<.05 level after Holm-Bonferroni 
correction are listed below.147 Then, a chart is included that shows how these 
traits or responses to questions influenced outcomes. 
We found that the following traits (or ratings on a scale of traits) were pre-
dictive: 
1. Political views on social issues (1 is conservative and 5 is liberal); 
2. Political Views on fiscal issues (1 is conservative and 5 is liberal); 
3. Self-identifying as Conservative (Yes/No); 
4. Disagreement/Agreement with statement the world has become too 
whiny (5 point Likert); 
5. Disagreement/Agreement with statement that compassion for people 
different from oneself is good. (5 point Likert); 
6. Disagreement/Agreement with statement the world had become Too 
Policitally Correct (PC); 
7. Disagreement/Agreement with statement the USA is the greatest 
country; 
8. Republican (out of choice of parties); 
9. Disagreement/Agreement with statement that there are too many 
frivolous lawsuits. 
The chart below includes the following information, from left to right: 
Case type (employment discrimination = discrim, personal injury = injury, 
and insurance = insure). 
The trait/rating that was predictive was abbreviated as needed. 
The last three columns show the maximum and minimum predicted proba-
bility of finding liability over the full range of the explanatory variable, fol-
lowed by the average change in probability for a one point increase in the Lik-
ert or binary explanatory variable. 
To make sure this is clear, consider what the first row tells us: 
It addresses the employment discrimination case. It covers how jurors rated 
themselves when asked how they viewed themselves politically, in relation to 
social issues. And it shows the maximum and minimum predicted liability find-
ings on that case are as high as 65.4 percent and as low as 46 percent. For each 
point on the scale (moving from 1 = conservative to 5 = liberal), we see a 4.8 
percent increase in liability. 
                                                        
147  This correction is designed to make sure that false positives are less likely to be reported. 
It is considered a rigorous statistical test that avoids reporting results that appear meaningful 
but are not. For a more detailed, but still simplified explanation, see Holm-Bonferroni Meth-
od: Step by Step, STATISTICS HOW TO, http://www.statisticshowto.com/holm-bonferroni-met 
hod/ [https://perma.cc/GN89-48FC] (last visited Sept. 21, 2018). 
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HYPOTHESIS 1 RESULTS 
Case Variable Max. Min. Avg. 
discrim political_social 0.654 0.460 0.048 
injury political_social 0.642 0.447 0.049 
insure political_social 0.697 0.509 0.047 
discrim political_fiscal 0.707 0.422 0.071 
injury political_fiscal 0.690 0.403 0.072 
insure political_fiscal 0.746 0.470 0.069 
discrim Conservative 0.681 0.442 -0.024 
injury Conservative 0.662 0.420 -0.024 
insure Conservative 0.720 0.487 -0.023 
discrim victim_whiny_bad 0.681 0.495 -0.031 
injury victim_whiny_bad 0.660 0.471 -0.032 
insure victim_whiny_bad 0.718 0.538 -0.030 
discrim compassion_for_diff_good 0.644 0.396 0.041 
injury compassion_for_diff_good 0.625 0.376 0.041 
insure compassion_for_diff_good 0.691 0.447 0.041 
discrim too_pc 0.705 0.502 -0.034 
injury too_pc 0.687 0.481 -0.034 
insure too_pc 0.745 0.552 -0.032 
discrim Republican 0.614 0.479 -0.135 
injury Republican 0.594 0.458 -0.136 
insure Republican 0.657 0.525 -0.132 
discrim usa_greatest 0.655 0.518 -0.023 
injury usa_greatest 0.635 0.497 -0.023 
insure usa_greatest 0.692 0.560 -0.022 
discrim too_many_frivol 0.748 0.515 -0.039 
injury too_many_frivol 0.729 0.491 -0.040 
insure too_many_frivol 0.782 0.563 -0.037 
Looking at the chart as a whole, we see that some individual traits proved 
predictive, and that they could produce reasonably large differences in results. 
For example: 
•     Republicans found liability 13 percent less often than an average 
juror. 
•     As people moved from “strongly disagree to strongly agree” on a 
Likert scale measuring whether jurors agreed that the “USA is the 
greatest country,” jurors got about 2 percent worse on liability for 
every step. Suggesting that avidly pro-American jurors are bad for 
plaintiffs. 
•     The more a person believes that “there are too many frivolous law-
suits,” the less likely they are to find liability. Each step on the 
Likert scale decreased the likelihood by a little less than 4 percent. 
19 NEV. L.J.187, CAMPBELL 1/28/2019  12:41 PM 
222 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1  
 
•     Being fiscally liberal makes a bigger difference in liability (per 
step on a five points scale) than being socially liberal. Each step 
towards being fiscally liberal is worth about a 7 percent increase in 
win rate, whereas being socially liberal amounts to a little less than 
a 5 percent increase. 
In net, these results paint a picture consistent with conventional wisdom 
regarding conservative jurors. Conservative people (fiscally and socially) are 
less likely to find for plaintiffs. So are Republicans. This is also true for people 
who score high on nationalism (USA is the greatest country), people who reject 
PC culture, people who believe there are too many lawsuits, and people who 
think the world has become too whiny. 
Interestingly, the results were not statistically significant for people’s views 
on religion, gender, age, race, income, education, or many of the other demo-
graphic characteristics we so often used to segment society. 
1. Juror Types 
The data was also analyzed to see whether certain combinations of answers 
to questions were predictive. These jury types were identified using factor 
analysis. In the pilot study, this analysis showed that eight underlying factors 
were adequate to model the results. However, the full data required thirteen fac-
tors. After multiple test correction, none of these factors was significantly pre-
dictive of liability at the p<.05 level. 
This largely confirmed our first hypothesis. Some answers to voir dire 
questions were predictive, while basic demographic traits were not predictive. 
Surprisingly, combinations of answers identified through factor analysis were 
not predictive. 
B. Results for Hypothesis 2—Jurors will respond better to cases framed in 
language that mirrors their characteristics and reported beliefs. 
As an initial note, I concede that the “frames” provided for the cases—
conservative, progressive, or blended—were lengthy in comparison to the 
overall case facts. Some were as much as 75 percent of the length of the total 
case. It is a fair criticism that they were likely longer in relation to the facts 
than any opening statement or closing argument would be in relation to a real 
case. This suggested that any framing effects identified might be overstated 
compared to the real world. 
Based on this reality, the results were even more surprising. No frame 
made any statistically significant difference. Neither jurors who tended to align 
with the frames nor jurors who tended to express opposite values were impact-
ed. 
To test for effects of interactions of attitude with frame, we applied likeli-
hood ratio tests to a model with liability dependent on case, frame, and the sig-
nificant attitudes found above, together with each response to a model with lia-
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bility dependent on case, frame, and the significant attitudes found above, to-
gether with the interaction of the corresponding response and frame. None of 
the interaction models were a significant improvement on the corresponding 
model without interaction at the p<.05 level with Holm-Bonferroni correction. 
Some individual models showed were modestly statistically significant with p-
values in the range (0.02, 0.05), if multiple test correction was (incorrectly) 
omitted. The same result was observed for the thirteen factors. 
This defies conventional wisdom. 
Given these findings, we also tested to see whether seeing a frame, versus 
seeing no frame, produced any measurable effect. We wondered if jurors in 
general responded positively or negatively to frames. We found no meaningful 
effects here, either. 
At a very real level, this suggests that having people read an attorney’s 
frame of the case, even when that frame contained ideas the jurors openly 
agreed with, made no difference. The jurors disregarded the statements. 
C. Jurors will respond best when the frame is introduced first, as opposed to 
when framing occurs only in closing argument. 
The models of interactions of frame and response above, run separately on 
frames presented first, then on frames presented in closing argument, also 
failed to improve on the models without interaction. 
Put simply, framing had no effect, whether it was introduced first or last. 
This defies the predictions of some scholars and of many studies on primacy. 
D. Conservative and progressive jurors will show similar levels of motivated 
reasoning and cultural cognition, consistent with ERT theory. 
As discussed in the background section, NPT would predict that conserva-
tives, would be more likely to be impacted by motivated reasoning. NPT hy-
pothesizes that, particularly, conservatives who are not open-minded and who 
are resistant to facts would likely be more impacted by familiar language. 
Instead, this study suggests that jurors across the spectrum resisted belief 
mirroring at similar levels. Splitting the interaction of response with frame into 
interaction of high responses with frames, and the interaction of low responses 
with frames, did not produce statistically significantly stronger models than the 
combined interaction. The absence of statistical significance of the interaction 
of response with frame was not due to the presence of a diverse structure of re-
actions to frames by jurors at each end of the response spectrum. 
IV. LIMITATIONS 
Limitation 1: The script presented to jurors was written. Cases are not. It is 
conceivable that a live person who delivers a message to jurors using words 
and ideas familiar to them might more quickly be viewed as a member of their 
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social group. This could trigger more intense motivated reasoning, halo effects, 
and the like. 
Limitation 2: Trial attorneys often try to build their frame into their entire 
case. They encourage experts to repeat it. They say it in opening and closing 
argument. Here, the frame was introduced only once. However, it was probably 
still a larger percentage of the total case presentation than it would be in trial. 
So, its failure to impact jurors cannot be fully explained by the fact it was re-
peated only once. 
Limitation 3: The framing statements were aggressively worded. They di-
rectly stated the views of the attorney. This may have caused jurors to push 
back. Some very experienced attorneys assert that trying to persuade too direct-
ly or too early can isolate jurors. For example, Rick Friedman, one of the best 
known trial attorneys in the country, wrote: “We want the jurors to discover 
these deeper currents of the case for themselves, which they will resist if we are 
fairly obvious.”148 He warned, “Remember, premature advocacy can be a cred-
ibility turnoff to skeptical jurors. You want to win them over with the facts.”149 
These observations may be true. But they cannot fully explain the null re-
sult, as we also checked to see if including frames generally reduced liability. 
Put another way, we checked to see if frames might turn off jurors and did not 
find evidence of this either. Instead, it was as if the frames were invisible. Ju-
rors decided the case on the facts, as viewed through their lenses, formed 
through life experience. 
It is also worth noting that although the frames in this study were aggres-
sive, these frames may not be far from reality. Many attorneys make inflamma-
tory opening statements, indeed some advocate for cinema like opening state-
ments.150 So, these openings were not outside the realm of normal statements 
given in court. 
Limitation 4: A final limitation may be that the frames were only intro-
duced in the plaintiff’s case. The court process is adversarial. However, we did 
produce a robust defense statement in each case. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Implication 1: As Hans, Diamond, and other have argued, jurors are not 
sheep, and juries are not as easily manipulated as some reports might sug-
                                                        
148  RICK FRIEDMAN & PATRICK MALONE, RULES OF THE ROAD: A PLAINTIFF LAWYER’S GUIDE 
TO PROVING LIABILITY 117 (2d ed. 2010). 
149  Id. at 152.  
150  For example, see this article by a trial attorney at a large firm, Kirkland and Ellis, argu-
ing in favor of titles for opening statements, comparing these to movie titles, and in general, 
asserting the key is to capture the jury’s attention. Michael D. Jones, The Opening State-
ment: Coming Soon to a Theatre Near You, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP (Oct. 1, 2004), https://w 
ww.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=223&itemId=2383 [https://perma.cc/Q6KZ-Z5 
DS]. 
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gest.151 Jurors are not overly prone to substitution, halo effects, or motivated 
reasoning. Although these effects and other cognitive biases certainly exist in 
jurors, they are not as easily manipulated as some suggest. Even when jurors 
who firmly agree that the world has become “too PC” and that hard work 
should be rewarded, they still did not respond positively to arguments that used 
those identical terms and related the facts of the case to those themes in plausi-
ble ways. Instead, jurors looked past the frames and decided the case on the 
facts. This is an encouraging fact for those who believe in juries. 
Implication 2: Opening statements may not serve as a lens or “schemata” 
to shape juror perception.152 Jurors may resist the spin of opening statements 
and wait until they are presented with the facts. 
Implication 3: Based on this study and previous research, there is good rea-
son to believe jurors do not make up their minds during the opening statement. 
Given that the frames did not alter outcomes, even when presented first, a fair 
conclusion is that jurors waited until reading the facts to make up their minds. 
Other studies conducted by this author and his co-authors support similar con-
clusions. For example, in one study, a ten-second manipulation occurred in the 
last minute of a forty-minute video.153 That brief manipulation dramatically al-
tered outcomes, suggesting jurors were still deciding the case.154 
Implication 4: Although jurors may not be as susceptible to spin as some 
believe, it is true that some combinations of personality traits correlate with 
how jurors will vote. This suggests that voir dire shapes juror outcomes in sig-
nificant ways. This includes situations in which voir dire is allowed, and attor-
neys may root out characteristics that matter for their case. And it also applies 
in courts that limit or almost completely eliminate voir dire, so that the jury is a 
random sample that could be, for a variety of reasons, a group that is prone to 
decide the case on preformed beliefs. 
Implication 5: Facts are king. Although many studies focus on extrajudicial 
influences on juries, there is reason to believe the strength of the evidence is the 
chief predictor of case outcome;155 the findings here suggests the same. At a 
very practical level, this suggests that attorneys like McGinn and Simon who 
believe you win cases through careful case selection, discovery, and spending 
time preparing outside the courtroom are likely right. As McGinn wrote, 
“There [is] no magic oratory, special power suit, or precise hand gestures that 
. . . make[s] me a great trial lawyer. It [is] all in how I prepared my cases.”156 
                                                        
151  Diamond & Rose, supra note 6, at 278; Hans, supra note 86, at 41. 
152  Diamond, supra note 35, at 742–43. 
153  Campbell et al., supra note 14, at 24. 
154  See id. 
155  Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 13 (1987). 
156  MCGINN, supra note 91, at 44. 
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Spend one-hundred hours in investigation and development for every hour in 
court.157 
Implication 6: Relatedly, if facts matter that means discovery matters. And 
it matters more than spin at trial. Attorneys win cases by building up the factual 
story. They cannot turn a poor case into a good one with eloquence or belief 
mirroring. 
Implication 7: Attorneys should be particularly careful when relying on 
demographic information, or even on answers to voir dire questions. The pre-
conceived belief that conservative jurors are bad for plaintiffs was not borne 
out, nor was the view that language and pandering would easily sway those that 
reject science and value faith over facts. In general, predictions about what 
characteristics will matter in a case must be done on a case by case basis. There 
were only a few traits that were predictive across cases, and the size of those 
effects was minimal. 
CONCLUSION 
Jurors are more lion than lemming. Framing a case so that it mirrors a ju-
ror’s personal views does not ensure that the juror will agree with the party who 
presented the frame. Similarly, jurors can look past case framing that conflicts 
with their own beliefs and decide a case on the facts. Likewise, jurors do not 
make up their minds when they are presented an opening statement that mirrors 
their beliefs. Instead, they have the ability to review facts presented after the 
opening statement and decide the case on those facts. Although belief mirroring 
will not manipulate jurors, there is evidence that some beliefs held by jurors 
can be predictive of how they will vote in cases. In particular, conventional 
wisdoms that conservative jurors are less likely to find liability found robust 
support in this study. Voir dire presents opportunities for attorneys to exploit 
this information. It also presents opportunities for courts to ensure impartial ju-
ries. Finally, if facts are king, then attorneys should spend the majority of their 
time building the best factual case they can. Eloquence and belief mirroring 
will not redeem a factually deficient case. 
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